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Abstract
■ An influential theory of ACC function argues that this brain
region plays a crucial role in the affective evaluation of perfor-
mance monitoring and control demands. Specifically, control-
demanding processes such as response conflict are thought
to be registered as aversive signals by ACC, which in turn trig-
gers processing adjustments to support avoidance learning. In
support of conflict being treated as an aversive event, recent
behavioral studies demonstrated that incongruent (i.e., conflict
inducing), relative to congruent, stimuli can speed up sub-
sequent negative, relative to positive, affective picture process-
ing. Here, we used fMRI to investigate directly whether ACC
activity in response to negative versus positive pictures is mod-
ulated by preceding control demands, consisting of conflict and
task-switching conditions. The results show that negative, rela-
tive to positive, pictures elicited higher ACC activation after
congruent, relative to incongruent, trials, suggesting that ACC’s
response to negative (positive) pictures was indeed affectively
primed by incongruent (congruent) trials. Interestingly, this
pattern of results was observed on task repetitions but dis-
appeared on task alternations. This study supports the proposal
that conflict induces negative affect and is the first to show that
this affective signal is reflected in ACC activation. ■
INTRODUCTION
ACC has been implicated in a variety of psychological
processes such as emotion regulation (Etkin, Egner, &
Kalisch, 2011), pain perception (Tracey & Mantyh,
2007), and cognitive control (Ridderinkhof, Ullsperger,
Crone, & Nieuwenhuis, 2004). In an integrative review
on ACC, Shackman and colleagues (2011) concluded that
its domain-general role must be one of driving aver-
sively motivated behavior. Consistent with this proposal,
Botvinick (2007) suggested that ACC generally signals
suboptimal outcomes that drive avoidance learning. In
doing so, Botvinick (2007) reinterpreted ACC’s role in one
of its most studied cognitive control functions: the moni-
toring of cognitive conflict (Botvinick, Cohen, & Carter,
2004; Botvinick, Braver, Barch, Carter, & Cohen, 2001).
Namely, Botvinick (2007) hypothesized that ACC’s re-
sponse to cognitive conflict (i.e., the simultaneous acti-
vation of mutually incompatible stimulus, task, or response
representations) is registered as an aversive signal, much
like pain or punishment. Although this idea has gained
widespread attention and inspired many behavioral stud-
ies to test if conflict is indeed experienced as an aver-
sive event (for reviews, see Dreisbach & Fischer, 2015;
Inzlicht, Bartholow, & Hirsh, 2015; van Steenbergen,
2015), to the best of our knowledge, no imaging study
to date has investigated directly whether ACC’s response
to cognitive conflict does in fact also register as an affec-
tively aversive signal (Botvinick, 2007; see also Shenhav,
Botvinick, & Cohen, 2013).
In the wake of Botvinick’s (2007) proposal, a growing
number of behavioral studies confirmed its first as-
sumption, namely, that cognitive conflicts appear to be
experienced as aversive events (Dignath & Eder, 2015;
Fritz & Dreisbach, 2013, 2015; Schouppe et al., 2012, 2015;
Dreisbach & Fischer, 2012; Brouillet, Ferrier, Grosselin,
& Brouillet, 2011; for a review, see Dreisbach & Fischer,
2015). For example, Dreisbach and Fischer (2012) investi-
gated this by combining a classic color Stroop task (Stroop,
1935) with an affective priming paradigm (Fazio, 2001). In
an affective priming paradigm, participants are asked to
categorize affective words (e.g., “flower” or “bomb”) based
on their valence (i.e., positive or negative) as fast as pos-
sible. These affective probes are preceded by task-irrelevant
stimuli (i.e., the prime). If the prime elicits an affective re-
sponse, it is thought to speed up the subsequent process-
ing (i.e., categorization) of similarly valenced stimuli. For
example, a prime that elicits negative affect would speed
up the categorization of negative words but slow down
positive word categorization. By using congruent (e.g., the
word “red” in red ink) or incongruent (e.g., theword “red” in
blue ink) Stroop stimuli as primes, Dreisbach and Fischer
(2012) demonstrated how perceiving incongruent (i.e.,
conflict-inducing) stimuli can speed up valence categoriza-
tion of negative, relative to positive, pictures or words (see
also Fritz & Dreisbach, 2013, 2015; Schouppe et al., 2015).
This work demonstrated the value of assessing affective
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on the motivational dimension of cognitive control. How-
ever, although these behavioral studies often link back
their findings to theories of ACC, this region’s involvement
in congruency-dependent affective processes has not yet
been studied directly. Inspired by these affective priming
paradigms, we here used an fMRI study with postconflict
affective picture probe presentation as a gauge on the
affective concomitants of conflict processing in ACC. In
line with the logic of behavioral priming paradigms, it
has also been shown that, when a brain region is involved
in processing a particular class of stimuli or signals, it will
show a diminished response when two signals of the
same class occur in succession, compared with when
different signals or stimuli are processed—a phenomenon
known as repetition suppression (for a review, see Grill-
Spector, Henson, & Martin, 2006). Therefore, following
Botvinick’s (2007) hypothesis that ACC registers conflict
as an aversive signal, we can expect that the presentation
of negative pictures after incongruent trials and positive
pictures after congruent trials will result in diminished
ACC activation, because of affect-based repetition sup-
pression. By contrast, “nonmatching” negative pictures
after congruent trials and positive pictures after incon-
gruent trials should result in relatively higher ACC activity,
because of a lack of a repetition suppression effect.
Interestingly, these predictions are also compatible with
recent reinforcement learning models of ACC function
that emphasize a more general role for ACC in signaling
unexpected (performance) outcomes (Silvetti, Alexander,
Verguts, & Brown, 2014; Alexander & Brown, 2011; Silvetti,
Seurinck, & Verguts, 2011). For example, because people
learn that the more difficult incongruent trials have a
lower likelihood of being followed by a correct and fast
response, incongruent trials may become associated with
a poorer outcome expectancy. Therefore, when inter-
preting ACC activation as a surprise reaction to the affec-
tive content of the picture, participants may plausibly be
more surprised to experience positive affect after an in-
congruent trial or negative affect after a congruent trial
because of their differences in outcome expectancies
(Alexander & Brown, 2011; Silvetti et al., 2011).
Although much of the behavioral and computational
work discussed above has focused on conflict processing
specifically, Botvinick’s (2007) hypothesis can easily be
extended to other effortful control processes, such as
task switching. Therefore, we examined affective pic-
ture probe processing after trials (acting as primes) of a
conflict task-switching paradigm. These analyses were
applied to a subset of participants from a larger (multi-
group) data set that we previously reported on in a dif-
ferent context (Braem et al., 2013). None of the imaging
analyses between the current and previous articles over-
lap. In this paradigm, trials could be defined by both
their task rule congruency (i.e., a stimulus could require
either the same or a different response in both tasks) and
whether the current task was the same (i.e., task repeti-
tion) or different (i.e., task alternation) to the preceding
trial. Besides the well-known observation that people
react slower and less accurately on task alternations as
opposed to task repetitions (i.e., the task switch cost;
Monsell, 2003), task rule congruency effects are also
found to be larger on task alternations than task repe-
titions (Meiran, 2000). The latter observation is assumed
to reflect an automatic priming effect from the task rules
that were active on the previous trial (Meiran & Kessler,
2008). Namely, the competing task rules are more ac-
tive on task alternation than task repetition trials because
they were only executed on the preceding trial and
therefore interfere more with the required task rules
on the present trial (i.e., larger task rule congruency
effects).
According to Botvinick (2007), both conflict process-
ing and task switching can be considered effortful pro-
cesses, characterized by their higher RTs and error rates
on incongruent trials and task alternations, respectively.
Consistent with their aversive task demands, people will
actively avoid tasks that require a higher amount of task
switching (Kool, McGuire, Rosen, & Botvinick, 2010) or
conflict processing (Schouppe, Ridderinkhof, Verguts, &
Notebaert, 2014). Hence, task alternations can be con-
sidered similar to cognitive conflict in terms of cognitive
effort, and therefore, we could expect a similar effect on
affective picture processing after task alternations versus
task repetitions, as we do after incongruent versus con-
gruent trials. Second, we can expect an enhanced effect
of congruency-dependent affective processing in ACC
during task alternations—given the observation that con-
gruency effects are enhanced during task alternations.
In summary, our primary goal was to provide a first
direct test of the proposal that conflict is registered as
an aversive event by ACC, by adopting the logic of the
affective priming paradigm from a purely behavioral con-
text (Dreisbach & Fischer, 2012) to a neuroimaging set-
ting. As a secondary goal, our task protocol also allowed
us to explore the affective signature of task switching and
how the relationship between conflict processing and




Seventeen participants took part in this study. One par-
ticipant was not included in the analyses because 30% of
their responses exceeded the response registration dead-
line. The remaining 16 participants (eight women and
eight men, mean age = 27 years, SD = 7 years) had a
mean of 3.1% unregistered responses (SD = 3%). Every
participant had normal or corrected-to-normal vision, was
right-handed as assessed by the Edinburgh Handedness
Inventory, and reported no current or history of neuro-
logical, psychiatric, or major medical disorder. Every partic-
ipant gave their written informed consent before the
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experiment and was paid $35 for participating afterward as
well as an extra $16 as part of the experiment’s reinforce-
ment schedule (which will be explained below). The study
was completed with the approval of the Duke University
Health System institutional review board.
Stimuli
As affective probe stimuli, we used 50 positive and 50
negative pictures from the International Affective Pictures
System (IAPS; Lang, Bradley, & Cuthbert, 2008) database.
The pictures werematched on their semantic content (e.g.,
cute animal vs. dangerous animal, crying baby vs. smiling
baby, sunset vs. thunderstorm) to avoid differences in
picture processing that could be attributable to other
non-affect-related features (e.g., living vs. nonliving). The
imperative task stimuli, which served as “primes” in this
affective priming protocol, consisted of the (affectively
neutral) numerals 1–9, excluding 5; these stimuli were
always presented in isoluminant green or blue. All pictures
and task stimuli were centrally presented on a black back-
ground. The experiment was projected on a back-projection
screen, which participants viewed in a mirror mounted to
the head coil. This arrangement resulted in picture sizes
of approximately 10° wide and 7.4° long and task stimuli of
approximately 0.4° wide and 0.8° long. Responses were
made via anMR-compatible response box (Current Designs,
Philadelphia, PA) positioned on the participants’ abdomen
(perpendicular to the length of their body). Participants
had to use their left or right hand to press the leftmost or
rightmost button (of four horizontally aligned response but-
tons), respectively. The stimuli were presented with Presen-
tation software (Neurobehavioral Systems, Berkeley, CA).
Procedure
To assess the effects of conflict processing during task
repetitions or task alternations on affect processing (pos-
itive or negative IAPS pictures), we presented an affective
picture probe (positive or negative) after each trial (act-
ing as a prime) of a standard conflict task-switching par-
adigm. Importantly, picture valence was always selected
at random and thus independent of the congruency or
task-switching conditions. However, whether a picture
would be presented (independent of its valence) was de-
pendent on performance speed and accuracy. Specifically,
participants were informed that task stimuli would be
followed by a randomly chosen positive or negative pic-
ture and that positive pictureswere associatedwith 10 cents
of monetary gain (to assure picture valence processing),
but there would be no picture presentation after incorrect
or too slow responses (exceeding the 1500-msec deadline).
During the task, participants had to respond to the
magnitude or parity of the task stimulus, depending on
its color. For example, when the number was presented
in green, participants had to press left when it was
smaller than 5 and right when it was larger than 5. Alter-
natively, when the number was presented in blue, partic-
ipants had to respond to its parity by indicating whether
it was odd with a left-hand response or even with a right-
hand response. The color cuing the magnitude versus
parity task was counterbalanced across participants. Impor-
tantly, each number was associated with one response for
each task set. Because these task sets were assigned to
overlapping response sets, each number could either pro-
duce the same (i.e., congruent) or different (i.e., incon-
gruent) responses in the two tasks. Moreover, the stimuli
were presented in a random order (excluding number
repetitions), which could result in task repetitions and
task alternations. Overall, these manipulations produced
a factorial design with three within-participant factors of
interest: prime trial congruency (congruent vs. incongru-
ent trial), task sequence (task repetition vs. task switch),
and probe valence (positive vs. negative). For the behav-
ioral data analysis, the former two factors allowed us
to assess the classic congruency effect, task-switching
effect, and the predicted enhancement of congruency
effects on task alternations (Meiran, 2000). By contrast,
our fMRI analyses exploited the full three-way design by
focusing on the neural activity elicited by affective pic-
ture probe stimuli as a function of picture valence and
the congruency and task sequence status of the preced-
ing prime stimulus.
As can be seen in Figure 1A, each trial started with the
presentation of a colored number stimulus 0.6° above a
central fixation dot for 200 msec. The central fixation dot
remained on-screen throughout the task. Participants
were required to respond within 1500 msec after stimu-
lus onset. After a variable stimulus–picture interval, an
IAPS picture was presented for 500 msec, followed by
another variable picture–stimulus interval until the next
digit stimulus was presented. Importantly, the stimulus–
picture interval was time-locked to the stimulus onset
and thus independent of response speed, ensuring that
differences in picture processing after different task con-
ditions could not be attributed to differences in the
stimulus–picture interval. Both the stimulus–picture and
picture–stimulus intervals were independently randomized
and drawn from a pseudoexponential distribution (50%
lasted 3 sec; 25%, 3.5 sec; 12%, 4 sec; 7%, 4.5 sec; and
6%, 5 sec), resulting in a mean time interval of ∼3.5 sec.
This way, picture presentation can be studied indepen-
dently from task stimulus presentations (e.g., Ollinger,
Shulman, & Corbetta, 2001). When the participant’s re-
sponse was incorrect or exceeded the response deadline,
picture presentation was replaced by the presentation of
the fixation dot for 500 msec.
Participants performed five experimental blocks of
64 trials each during scanning, after a short practice block
of 32 trials outside the scanner. In between blocks, there
was a short break during which the participants could see
their updated score. Each of the 32 stimulus–picture com-
binations (eight numbers × two task colors × picture
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valence) were presented 10 times in a randomized order.
IAPS pictures were randomly chosen from the appro-
priate valence group but never reoccurred within a block.
Although there was some variation in the amount of
money participants obtained during the experiment (be-
cause of differences in performance accuracy), all partici-
pants were given the same maximum amount of money
possible at the end of the experiment.
Figure 1. (A) Trial procedure (two successive trials) and different task conditions of interest are denoted. Participants were presented with
randomly chosen positive or negative pictures after each task stimulus, except when the preceding response to the task stimulus was incorrect
or too slow (>1500 msec). Participants had to respond to the digit stimuli’s parity or magnitude, depending on stimulus color. Examples of the
different possible task conditions of interest are denoted: Picture processing was investigated depending on its valence (negative or positive)
and the congruency (incongruent or congruent) and task sequence (repetition or alternation) identity of the immediately preceding stimulus.
The words in italic were not presented during the experiment, and the background color in the experiment was black. (B) The behavioral results
demonstrate how both RTs and error rates were higher for incongruent relative to congruent trials. Moreover, this difference between both
congruency conditions was smaller on task repetitions relative to task alternations. All error bars are ±1 SEM.
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Behavioral Data Analyses
All trials after an error and the first trial of each block were
removed from the analyses. We carried out an ANOVA
with the within-participant factors Trial congruency (con-
gruent vs. incongruent) and Task sequence (repetition vs.
switch) on correct RTs and error rates.
fMRI Data Acquisition
Imaging was conducted on a GE Discovery MR750 system
(GE Healthcare Systems, Milwuakee, WI) at 3.0 T using a
standard head coil. We acquired functional images parallel
to the AC–PC plane with a T2*-weighted single-shot gra-
dient EPI sequence of 36 contiguous axial slices (repeti-
tion time = 2000 msec, echo time = 28 msec, flip angle =
90°, field of view = 192 mm, array size = 64 × 64) with
3-mm thickness and 3 × 3mm in-plane resolution. Struc-
tural images were acquired with a T1-weighted Fast Spoiled
Gradient-Recalled-Echo axial scan using a 3-D inversion
recovery prepared sequence, recording 120 slices with
1-mm thickness and in-plane resolution of 1 × 1 mm.
fMRI Data Analysis
The preprocessing steps and statistical analyses were
performed using SPM8 (www.fil.ion.ucl.ac.uk/spm/software/
spm8/). Functional data were slice-time corrected and
spatially realigned to the first volume of the task. The struc-
tural image was normalized to the Montreal Neurological
Institute (MNI) template brain (resampled voxel size =
2 mm3). These normalization parameters were then ap-
plied to the functional images to ensure an anatomically
informed normalization. The first five volumes of each
run in which no stimulation occurred were discarded
before estimating statistical models, and a 128-sec temporal
high-pass filter was applied to remove low-frequency drifts.
Temporal autocorrelations were estimated using restricted
maximum likelihood estimates of variance components
with a first-order autoregressive model, and the resulting
nonsphericity was used to form maximum likelihood esti-
mates of activations. A spatial smoothing filter of 8-mm
FWHM was applied.
Event-related regressors convolved with a canonical
hemodynamic response function were created corre-
sponding to the picture onsets and stimulus onsets of
each trial. Importantly, the picture-locked regressors were
defined by the valence of the picture (positive or nega-
tive) as well as the congruency and the task sequence
identity of the preceding stimulus (congruent or incon-
gruent and task repetition or task alternation). We also
modeled the stimulus-locked regressors as a function of
their congruency and task sequence features as well as
error trials, trials after an error, and the first trial of each
run as separate nuisance variables. Last, both picture- and
stimulus-locked regressors were further defined by the
picture valence of the preceding trial to control for pos-
sible carry-over effects of previous affective picture pre-
sentations. Single-participant contrasts on picture-locked
regressors were calculated to establish the hemodynamic
correlates of picture valence, depending on the preceding
congruency and task sequence conditions. Specifically, we
first investigated the contrast between negative versus
positive picture presentation after congruent versus in-
congruent trials, for task repetitions only. This contrast
allows us to evaluate our main hypothesis that ACC is sen-
sitive to the aversiveness of cognitive conflict (Botvinick,
2007) in a way that is most similar to earlier behavioral
studies, which used single-conflict tasks only (for a review,
see Dreisbach & Fischer, 2015). In a second step, we also
looked at the picture-locked contrast that includes the
factors Picture valence and Task sequence to study the
affective evaluation of task-switching conditions. Finally,
we analyzed the contrast between picture valence, con-
gruency, and task sequence to further explore the role of
task sequences in the hypothesized congruency-dependent
affective picture processing of ACC.
To control for false-positive rates, we determined
contrast-specific combined voxel activation intensities
and cluster extent thresholds that are corrected for mul-
tiple comparisons by using 3dClustSim (afni.nimh.nih.
gov/pub/dist/doc/program_help/3dClustSim.html). This
software runs 10,000 Monte Carlo simulations that take
into account the whole-brain search volume and estimated
smoothness of each axis of the respective group SPMs and
thereby generates probability estimates of a random field
of noise producing a cluster of voxels of a given extent
for a set of voxels passing a specific voxelwise p value
threshold, which we set at .005 for all analyses. Given this
threshold, the 3dClustSim simulations determined that
cluster sizes of 301–334 voxels, depending on the specific
contrast, corresponded to a combined threshold of
p < .05 (corrected).
ROI Analyses
We extracted mean β estimates (i.e., mean cluster activa-
tion) from empirically defined ROIs with Marsbar software
(marsbar.sourceforge.net/) to evaluate interaction effects.
RESULTS
Behavioral Data
Mean accuracy on this task was 89.9%, and mean RT was
834 msec. As expected, there was a typical congruency
effect that was expressed in higher RTs, F(1, 15) = 54.1,
p < .001, and higher error rates, F(1, 15) = 48.9, p <
.001, for incongruent trials (883 msec, 10.9%) as opposed
to congruent trials (793 msec, 2.4%). We also observed a
significant task-switch cost in both RTs, F(1, 15) = 44.0,
p< .001, and error rates, F(1, 15) = 28.3, p< .001, reflect-
ing higher RTs and error rates when a task alternated
(870 msec, 8.6%) as opposed to when the task repeated
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(806 msec, 4.7%). Furthermore, there was a significant
interaction between congruency and task sequence in
both RTs, F(1, 15) = 7.3, p < .05, and error rates, F(1,
15) = 11.7, p < .01, because of a greater congruency
effect for task-switch than task-repeat trials or, con-
versely, a larger switch effect for incongruent than for
congruent trials (see Figure 1B). No other main effects
or interactions reached significance (all ps > .1).
Thus, in line with expectations, these data confirm that
incongruent trials were more difficult than congruent trials
and task alternations were more demanding than task
repetitions. Moreover, consistent with the previous litera-
ture, the congruency effect was more pronounced during
task alternations than task repetitions (Meiran, 2000). As
outlined above, both observations are important in setting
up our predictions regarding the influence of conflict
conditions on affective processing.
fMRI Data: The Effect of Conflict on Affective
Picture Processing
Next, we analyzed the picture-locked interaction contrast
that includes both congruency and picture valence, for task
repetitions only. We focused on task repetitions, as these
most closely resemble the task conditions under which the
affective signatures of conflict processing have previously
been investigated (Fritz & Dreisbach, 2013, 2015;
Schouppe et al., 2015; Dreisbach & Fischer, 2012; Brouillet
et al., 2011). If incongruent (relative to congruent) trials are
indeed experienced as more negative, because of either
their higher control demands (Botvinick, 2007) or lower
outcome expectancy (Alexander & Brown, 2011; Silvetti
et al., 2011), we expected these trials to elicit lower ACC
activation during subsequent affectively matching negative
picture presentations but higher ACC activations during
the presentation of affectively nonmatching positive pic-
ture presentations and vice versa for congruent trials.
The contrast for the Picture valence × Congruency
interaction on task repetitions resulted in the whole-
brain corrected activations of the (dorsal) ACC (Fig-
ure 2A) as well as the dorsomedial pFC (dmPFC), left
inferior frontal sulcus, left insula, left precuneus, and
right thalamus (see Table 1). Consistent with earlier re-
ports of conflict-related ACC activation, our ACC acti-
vation was restricted to more dorsal portions of ACC,
seemingly extending into the SMA and other more dorsal
or prefrontal medial regions. Alternatively, this could also
reflect activity in the paracingulate sulcus, a portion of
the dorsal ACC that is known to sometimes expand
dorsally (as also discussed in this review on ACC function;
Shackman et al., 2011). The interaction effect in the acti-
vation of ACC was in line with our expectations regard-
ing its role in the affective evaluation of congruency
conditions (Alexander & Brown, 2011; Silvetti et al., 2011;
Botvinick, 2007). To determine the source of this inter-
action, we extracted mean ROI activation values and sub-
mitted them to planned comparisons. Specifically, we
extracted the mean ROI activation of the cluster activation
in ACC/dmPFC (Figure 2C) to evaluate the more anterior
cluster. The more posterior ACC cluster, however, was
connected to a larger cluster whose peak activation was
in the right thalamus (see Table 1). Therefore, this ACC
activation was evaluated by analyzing the mean activation
around this cluster’s third local maximum, which was
closest to ACC (a 5-mm sphere around x = 6, y = 20, z =
38). Besides the significant interaction between Congru-
ency and Valance (on which the ROI was selected), ACC/
dmPFC cluster also showed a main effect of Valence with
overall higher activation during negative as opposed to
positive picture presentations, F(1, 15) = 10.34, p < .01,
replicating a host of previous imaging studies (reviewed
in Etkin et al., 2011; Shackman et al., 2011). The more
posterior ACC activation did not show this main effect,
F(1, 15) = 2.09, p = .17. More importantly, as can be
Figure 2. (A) ACC as identified by the picture-locked contrast for the congruency-dependent valence effect on task repetitions (valence effect
after congruent trials > valence effect after incongruent trials) regression analysis, plotted at p < .05 (corrected) on sagittal (x = 0) of an individual
brain in MNI space. (B, C) Group mean activations (β estimates ± SEM ) in ACC are plotted for each valence (green is positive; red is negative)
and congruency condition, for task repetitions only. The mean activations were based on either the mean cluster activation in ACC/dmPFC (C;
abbreviated by ACC/dmPFC) or a 5-mm sphere around a more posterior ACC cluster’s peak activation (B; x = 6, y = 20, z = 38), because this
peak was part of a cluster extending into other regions as well (see Results). The error bars are displayed for the purpose of visual presentation
(not statistical inference) of the patterns of activation means and variance observed in the ROIs that were identified based on the statistical inference
drawn by the whole-brain corrected group analysis.
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seen in Figure 2B and 2C, the interaction between con-
gruency and picture valence in ACC/dmPFC originated
from a significantly lower activation for negative pictures
after incongruent as opposed to congruent trials, t(15) =
2.971, p = .01, and positive pictures after congruent rela-
tive to incongruent trials, t(15) = 3.989, p= .001. A similar
pattern could be observed in the more posterior ACC
cluster (t(15) = 2.098, p = .053, and t(15) = 1.925, p =
.073, respectively). These results are concordant with the
idea that the higher control demands associated with in-
congruent, relative to congruent, trials triggered negative
evaluation (Botvinick, 2007) that attenuated ACC response
to negative, but not positive, picture probes. Alternatively,
when interpreting ACC activation as violations of outcome
expectancies (Alexander & Brown, 2011; Silvetti et al.,
2011), participants might have been more surprised to
encounter negative pictures after a congruent trial or pos-
itive pictures after an incongruent trial. Both interpreta-
tions are in line with our predictions and the available
literature arguing that incongruent trials are experienced
as aversive events (Dreisbach & Fischer, 2015; Inzlicht
et al., 2015). Similar to ACC/dmPFC, the interaction in
the three other regions (one of which includes the sphere
of the more posterior ACC activation) was also driven by
a significantly higher activation both for negative pic-
tures after congruent as opposed to incongruent trials,
ts(15) > 2.890, ps < .05, and positive pictures after in-
congruent relative to congruent trials, ts(15) > 3.054,
ps < .01. Different from ACC/dmPFC, however, the
other three regions did not show a main effect of Valence,
F(1, 15) < 1.15, p > .3.
fMRI Data: The Effect of Task Switching on
Affective Picture Processing
Second, we studied the picture-locked interaction con-
trast that includes both task sequence conditions and
picture valence. The behavioral affective signatures of
cognitive conflict are well documented (e.g., Dreisbach
& Fischer, 2012). However, similar automatic affective
evaluations of task-switching conditions remain to be tested.
Still, although the framework of Botvinick (2007) mainly
focuses on conflict processing, its predictions can easily
be extended to task switching. Similar to conflict process-
ing, task switching can be considered an effortful mental
process that could also register as an aversive signal in
ACC. Consistently, people have been found to actively
avoid choice decks that are associated to a higher amount
of task switching (Kool et al., 2010).
Our first brain analyses did not support this hypothesis.
The contrast for Picture valence × Task sequence inter-
action did not reveal any significant whole-brain corrected
activations. In addition, when testing in the opposite di-
rection, no effects of task-switching conditions on affec-
tive picture processing were observed. However, in close
analogy to our analysis into the effects of congruency on
Table 1. Picture Onset Locked Activations Revealed by the Picture Valence × Congruency Condition Contrast for Task Repetitions
Only, the Picture Valence × Task Sequence Contrast for Congruent Trials Only, and the Picture Valence × Congruency Condition ×
Task Sequence Contrast
Anatomical Area x y z Voxels Tmax
Picture valence as a function of preceding stimulus congruency, on task repetitions only (valence effect after congruent stimuli >
valence effect after incongruent stimuli)
ACC/dmPFC −6 42 30 618 5.18
Left inferior frontal sulcus/left insula −30 6 18 640 5.83
Left superior parietal lobe/left precuneus −34 −56 58 1320 4.64
Right thalamus/ACC 14 −26 16 2202 5.14
Picture valence as a function of preceding task sequence, on congruent trials only (valence effect after task repetitions >
valence effect after task alternations)
ACC/SMA 4 16 60 800 4.95
Cerebellum 8 −52 −6 450 5.39
Picture valence as a function of preceding stimulus congruency and task sequence
Dorsal ACC −2 20 54 362 3.94
Left inferior frontal sulcus/junction −28 8 44 572 6.11
Left superior parietal lobe/ left precuneus −40 −24 32 5258 5.50
Left STS −38 −34 0 979 5.39
Thalamus/cerebellum −4 −52 −6 1652 5.04
Right superior temporal gyrus/hippocampus 44 0 −26 379 5.44
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task repetitions only, one could also look at the effects of
task switching on congruent trials only, canceling out the
arguably interfering or obfuscating effects of incongruent
trials. Indeed, the contrast for the Picture valence × Task
sequence interaction on congruent trials only revealed
whole-brain corrected activations of the SMA and (dorsal)
ACC (Figure 3A) as well as the cerebellum (see Table 1).
Similar to the congruency-dependent analysis, follow-up
analyses on the mean ROI activation values showed that
this ACC/SMA region showed an overall higher activation
to negative relative to positive picture presentations, F(1,
15) = 6.79, p = .02. Moreover, the interaction between
task sequence and picture valence was again driven by a
significantly lower activation to both negative pictures after
task alternation as opposed to task repetition trials, t(15) =
3.266, p = .005, and positive pictures after task repetition
relative to task alternation trials, t(15) = 2.599, p = .02
(Figure 3B).
fMRI Data: The Role of Task Sequence in
Congruency-dependent Affective
Picture Processing
Next, we turned to task alternations to see if task switch-
ing either enhanced or counteracted the affective evalu-
ation of congruency. On task alternations, the congruency
effect is enhanced as compared with task repetitions, as
evidenced by both the RT and error rate analyses (see
Figure 1B). Therefore, if the reported effects of con-
gruency on affect processing are indeed a consequence
of their associated cognitive effort (Botvinick, 2007), we
would expect these aversive effects to be further en-
hanced during task alternations.
As a first test of this hypothesis, we reanalyzed the
mean ROI activation values from ACC/dmPFC region un-
covered by the congruency-dependent valence contrast
on task repetitions (Figure 2A) but now focused on its
activation pattern during task alternations instead.
Intriguingly, in contrast to its modulations during task
repetitions, ACC/dmPFC was no longer responsive to
picture valence, F(1, 15) = 1.376, p > .25, nor its inter-
action with congruency, F(1, 15) < 1, during task alter-
nations. Similarly, a separate whole-brain analysis of the
Congruency × Picture valence contrast on task alter-
nations only did not reveal any significant cluster activa-
tions (in neither direction). These analyses were further
confirmed by a whole-brain analysis of the three-way
interaction between task sequence, picture valence, and
congruency, which documented activations consistent
with these abovementioned results (Figure 4A). Namely,
the analysis again uncovered the (dorsal) ACC as well as
the left inferior frontal sulcus, left precuneus, left supe-
rior parietal areas, the left STS, and right superior tem-
poral gyrus. Although the peak ACC activation in this
contrast (Figure 4A) lies a little more posterior (x =
−2, y = 20, z = 54) than the peak of the cluster dis-
played in Figure 2A, its activation pattern remained quali-
tatively unchanged (trend level analyses at corrected p <
.1 revealed a more anterior ACC activation as well). Thus,
similar to the previous ROI, ACC showed a main effect of
Valence, F(1, 15) = 8.170, p < .05. Moreover, the inter-
action between Task sequence, Picture valence, and Con-
gruency (on which the ROI was selected) was again
driven by a congruency-dependent processing of picture
valence on task repetitions, F(1, 15) = 11.020, p = .005
(Figure 4B), but not on task alternations, F(1, 15) =
2.870, p > .1 (Figure 4C). Planned comparisons on the
task repetition trials again showed lower activation for
positive pictures after congruent as opposed to incongru-
ent trials, t(15) = 2.646, p = .018, and negative pictures
after incongruent relative to congruent trials, t(15) =
1.944, p = .071. The reverse contrast (e.g., regions show-
ing a larger congruency-dependent valence effect on task
alternations) did not garner any significant (or trend level)
above-threshold clusters. Together, these analyses clearly
suggest that the affective priming effect from conflict pro-
cessing was absent on task alternations. These findings
argue against the idea that ACC only signals for increased,
Figure 3. (A) ACC/SMA as
identified by the picture-locked
contrast for the task sequence-
dependent valence effect
on congruent trials only
(valence effect after task
repetitions > valence effect
after task alternations)
regression analysis, plotted
at p < .05 (corrected) on
sagittal (x = −4) of an
individual brain in MNI space.
(B) Group mean activations
(β estimates ± SEM ) in
ACC/SMA are plotted for each
valence (green is positive; red is negative) and task sequence condition, for congruent trials only. The mean activations were based on the
mean cluster activation in ACC/SMA. The error bars are displayed for the purpose of visual presentation (not statistical inference) of the patterns
of activation means and variance observed in the ROIs that were identified based on the statistical inference drawn by the whole-brain corrected
group analysis.
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inherently negative, cognitive demand (Botvinick, 2007),
because based on congruency effects being larger on task
alternations, one would have expected their affective
consequences to also be enhanced. In hindsight, this
can be considered consistent with the reinforcement
learning models of ACC function, which stipulate that
outcome expectancies are monitored for each task (or
context) and congruency condition separately (Alexander
& Brown, 2011; Silvetti et al., 2011). Given that empirical
studies have shown that task switching can interfere with
task-specific conflict processes (e.g., Braem, Abrahamse,
Duthoo, & Notebaert, 2014; Egner, 2008; Brown, Reynolds,
& Braver, 2007; Goschke, 2000), this raises the possibility
that task switching can also disrupt the task-specific eval-
uation of congruency outcome expectancies, which would
lead to a diminished responsiveness of ACC to the affec-
tive signatures of conflict processing on switch trials.
DISCUSSION
In this study, we investigated the effect of different con-
trol demands on subsequent affective picture processing.
We report for the first time that affective pictures were
differentially responded to by ACC dependent on pre-
ceding conflict and task-switching conditions. Consistent
with the behavioral literature on the affective value of
conflict processing (Dreisbach & Fischer, 2015), we ob-
served diminished ACC activation for negative picture
probes after incongruent prime trials or positive picture
probes after congruent prime trials. Interestingly, however,
this pattern was completely absent on task alternations.
Our main finding is consistent with Botvinick’s (2007)
hypothesis that ACC responds similarly to cognitive con-
flict and negative affect, registering both as aversive learn-
ing signals that drive certain forms of avoidance learning
(see also Shenhav et al., 2013; Shackman et al., 2011).
Dreisbach and Fischer (2012) already demonstrated
how the presentation of incongruent compared with con-
gruent stimuli can speed up the subsequent evaluative
categorization of negative relative to positive pictures
(see also Fritz & Dreisbach, 2013, 2015; Schouppe et al.,
2015). We now document the neural correlates of this
effect in ACC. Specifically, we show diminished ACC activity
in response to negative pictures after incongruent trials
(relative to positive pictures and congruent trials), which,
following the idea of repetition suppression (Grill-Spector
et al., 2006), suggests that ACC processes incongruent trials
and negatively valenced picture probe stimuli in a similar
fashion (Botvinick, 2007).
Similarly, the diminished processing of positive pic-
tures after congruent relative to incongruent trials could
be interpreted as positive affect elicited by congruent con-
ditions. Consistent with the idea that people might take
pleasure in encountering a congruent trial, Cannon, Hayes,
and Tipper (2010) did report larger zygomaticus activity
(muscle activity associated with smiling) after compatible
relative to incompatible trials. Therefore, within the local
context of an RT experiment, it seems reasonable to
Figure 4. (A) The regions as identified by the picture-locked contrast for the congruency-dependent valence effect on task repetition versus
alternation regression analysis, plotted at p < .05 (corrected) on sagittal (x = −4), sagittal (x = −40), coronal ( y = −34), and axial (z = 0) of
an individual brain in MNI space. (B, C) Group mean activations (β estimates ± SEM ) in ACC are plotted for each valence (green is positive; red is
negative) and congruency, for task repetitions (B) and task alternations (C) separately. The error bars are displayed for the purpose of visual
presentation (not statistical inference) of the patterns of activation means and variance observed in the ROIs that were identified based on the
statistical inference drawn by the whole-brain corrected group analysis.
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assume that people can experience some positive emo-
tions during easier trials, in light of knowing that there
are more difficult trials too. However, further evidence is
required to determine whether congruent conditions
automatically elicit positive affect.
Other studies have searched for the processing of a
coding of cognitive control “costs” in ACC. For example,
McGuire and Botvinick (2010) performed correlation
analyses between avoidance ratings or avoidance behav-
ior (in a subsequent test phase) with task-related brain
activity during a task-switching study. Although hypothe-
sized, they failed to find a relation between any medial
frontal cortex activity and cost processing. However, their
analyses focused on block-wise levels of avoidance ratings/
behavior, which might be less sensitive to ACC’s coding of
costs of moment-to-moment changes in behavior (as also
argued by the authors). More indirect evidence can be
found in a study by Botvinick, Huffstetler, and McGuire
(2009), which demonstrated that ACC’s response to effort
allocation during task performance inversely predicted
the participants’ striatal response to subsequent rewards,
argued to be consistent with the subjective experience of
mental effort. Similarly, Vassena and colleagues (2014)
demonstrated how ACC responded more to cues indicat-
ing a difficult task or high reward (contingent on task per-
formance), arguably signaling the need for costly and
effortful cognitive control processes (see also Prévost,
Pessiglione, Météreau, Cléry-Melin, & Dreher, 2010;
Croxson, Walton, O’Reilly, Behrens, & Rushworth, 2009).
These studies show that ACC responds to the cost asso-
ciated with the allocation of cognitive control resources.
However, in our study, we focused on the affective signa-
ture of this cost and were able to demonstrate that ACC
responds to the affectively aversive signal associated with
this allocation of cognitive control.
Importantly, positive pictures were also associated with
the prospect of (poststudy) monetary reward. On one
hand, this should serve to further enhance the positive
affect elicited by the picture stimulus; on the other hand,
this means we have to be careful in interpreting the
exact source of the putative positive affect. Interestingly,
although Shenhav and colleagues (2013) also suggest that
cognitive control demands can be considered aversive in
nature (as Botvinick, 2007), they added to this hypothesis
that the (dorsal) ACC should only be responsive to the
value of stimuli that are relevant to the allocation of con-
trol. Given that monetary gain can be considered more
relevant to the participants’ goals (in contrast to the mere
valence of the picture), it is possible that the present re-
sults are slightly different in nature from the automatic affec-
tive evaluation effects in the behavioral studies discussed
in the Introduction, where positive stimuli were not paired
to monetary gains (e.g., Dreisbach & Fischer, 2012).
As outlined above, the reinforcement learning models
of ACC are also consistent with these results (Silvetti
et al., 2011, 2014; Alexander & Brown, 2011). These
models suggest that ACC constantly updates outcome
expectancies (e.g., one’s chance to respond correctly)
for multiple stimulus–response–outcome associations in
parallel, thus registering separately for each task and
congruency condition whenever outcomes are different
than expected. Hence, if we follow this assumption that
different congruency conditions automatically activate
different outcome expectancies, which are affectively
tagged, we can expect the same results as predicted
by Botvinick (2007). First, the overall higher activation
elicited by negative relative to positive pictures in ACC/
dmPFC can be related to the overall surprise to experi-
ence negative affect after a positive outcome expectancy
elicited by the correct response (Braem, Coenen, Bombeke,
van Bochove, & Notebaert, 2015; Silvetti et al., 2011, 2014;
Desmet, Deschrijver, & Brass, 2013; Aarts, De Houwer, &
Pourtois, 2012; Wessel, Danielmeier, Morton, & Ullsperger,
2012; Alexander & Brown, 2011). However, participants
will also (implicitly) have better outcome expectancies
on congruent than incongruent trials and thus show higher
surprise reactions (i.e., negative prediction errors) when-
ever a negative event occurs during feedback presentation.
Conversely, the enhanced reaction to positive pictures
after incongruent relative to congruent trials can be attrib-
uted to their lower outcome expectancy and thus higher
surprise reaction to this positive outcome (i.e., positive
prediction error). In line with this idea, it has been sug-
gested that, in the absence of feedback, the correct re-
sponse to incongruent versus congruent trials in and of
itself could be experienced as more positively surprising
or inherently rewarding (Braem et al., 2015; Schouppe
et al., 2015; Braem, Verguts, Roggeman, &Notebaert, 2012).
Our task protocol also facilitated investigating the role
of task sequences on the affective evaluation of congru-
ency conditions in ACC. Interestingly, although we did
show how task alternations relative to repetitions simi-
larly resulted in a diminished ACC response to negative
pictures (on congruent trials only), we also observed that
the interaction between congruency and affect process-
ing could only be observed on task repetitions but not
task alternations. Although the latter observation was
unexpected, it can be considered concordant with the
idea that outcome expectancies are task and congruency
specific. Previous studies have demonstrated how task
switching can disrupt task-specific conflict processing
(Brown et al., 2007; Goschke, 2000; for reviews, see
Braem et al., 2014; Egner, 2008). Therefore, task switches
might have hindered an efficient affective evaluation of
congruency conditions. Although this observation seems
largely consistent with our interpretation of the reinforce-
ment learning models (Silvetti et al., 2011, 2014; Alexander
& Brown, 2011) of ACC, our experiment cannot, and was
not set up to, dissociate between these models and the
ideas put forward by Botvinick (2007). We hypothesized
that the aversive nature of cognitive demand (Botvinick,
2007) as reflected in the affective evaluation of congruency
conditions would be enhanced during task alternations—
which are also thought to be high in cognitive demand
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(Kool et al., 2010) and are known to enhance congruency
effects (Meiran, 2000; our data). However, although we
hypothesized otherwise, it is still possible that the affec-
tive evaluation of cognitive demand is also task specific:
Our data can only suggest that the affective concomitants
of conflict processing are task specific, irrespective of
whether these index the affective evaluation of cognitive
demand (Botvinick, 2007) or outcome expectancies (Silvetti
et al., 2011, 2014; Alexander & Brown, 2011).
More generally, this task specificity of conflict process-
ing is also consistent with the observation that adapta-
tions to conflict are often found to be task specific (for
reviews, see Braem et al., 2014; Egner, 2008). According
to a computational model by Brown et al. (2007), conflict
and task alternations evoke opposing learning signals:
Whereas the former induces exploitation of task-relevant
information, the latter promotes exploration for selecting
the appropriate task set. This was recently supported by
two independent surprise recognition memory studies
demonstrating that memory for task-relevant information
was improved under conflict conditions (Krebs, Boehler,
De Belder, & Egner, 2015), whereas it was impaired under
task-switching conditions (Richter & Yeung, 2012). In addi-
tion, in studies on affective modulations of cognitive con-
trol, a distinction is often made between both types of
cognitive effort as they are differentially affected by valence
manipulations. Whereas task-switching performance has
frequently been reported as improved after positive mood
induction (e.g., Dreisbach & Goschke, 2004), conflict pro-
cessing has often been found to be impaired under positive
mood (e.g., van Steenbergen, Band, & Hommel, 2010).
These findings further suggest that cognitive conflict and
task switches elicit opposing processes or strategies and,
on a more general level, are in line with our findings that
both differentially influenced affective feedback processing.
Notably, we were able to demonstrate the affective sig-
natures of both control processes—cognitive conflict and
task switching—but only after canceling out the other (i.e.,
focus on task repetition trials or congruent trials only,
respectively). Importantly, in this study, both factors were
manipulated orthogonally. Therefore, participants were
required to both switch back and forth between different
task sets, while simultaneously shielding the task-relevant
information from conflicting stimulus–response asso-
ciations. This way, both processes, thought to reflect op-
posing forces of cognitive control (Brown et al., 2007),
might have been in constant competition. If we had used
two separate designs instead (i.e., a conflict task without
task-switching conditions and a task-switching study with-
out conflicting stimuli), we might have been able to find
a similar effect on affective picture processing without
having to exclude task alternation or incongruent trials.
Future studies, including behavioral, are necessary to
further investigate the automatic affective evaluation of
congruency and task-switching conditions.
Lastly, the present findings also fit with recent observa-
tions that emotional distraction by negative pictures (rel-
ative to neutral pictures) appears to be reduced after
incongruent trials (Cohen, Moyal, & Henik, 2015; Cohen,
Henik, & Moyal, 2012; Cohen, Henik, & Mor, 2011; for a
review, see Okon-Singer, Lichtenstein-Vidne, & Cohen,
2013), concordant with our findings that incongruent
stimuli reduce the subsequent neural response to nega-
tive pictures, which could similarly suggest reduced nega-
tive emotion processing after incongruent trials (although
note that we lack behavioral measurements to support this
claim). For example, Cohen and colleagues (2015) demon-
strated how both the pupillary light reflex and the pupil
dilation response to negative pictures were attenuated
after incongruent trials. The authors interpreted these
findings as evidence for the hypothesis that emotional pro-
cessing is reduced after the recruitment of executive con-
trol (Cohen et al., in press; Okon-Singer et al., 2013).
Interestingly, as stated in the discussion of their findings
(Cohen et al., 2015), this hypothesis would also predict
reduced sensitivity to positive picture processing. The
present results document a reduced response to nega-
tive, but enhanced response to positive, pictures after
incongruent trials (see also Fritz & Dreisbach, 2013, 2015;
Schouppe et al., 2015; Dreisbach & Fischer, 2012). There-
fore, it remains to be determined whether studies would
find reduced emotional distraction when using positive
pictures (as the reduced distraction reported in Cohen
et al., 2011, 2012, 2015) or whether such studies would
show the opposite pattern instead. The latterwould suggest
that the results of Cohen and colleagues (2011, 2012, 2015)
could have been influenced by the aversive nature of con-
flict processing (Botvinick, 2007).
In conclusion, our results demonstrated how congruency
conditions influence affective processing in ACC. Although
ACC responded less to negative pictures after incongruent
than congruent trials, it showed more activation to positive
pictures after incongruent compared with congruent trials.
These results not only add to the growing number of obser-
vations that conflict is aversive (for a review, see Dreisbach &
Fischer, 2015) but crucially demonstrate for the first time
that ACC can indeed be considered a prime candidate for
registering the affective signature of conflict processing,
consistent with recent models that emphasize its integra-
tive role in cognition and emotion (Silvetti et al., 2011,
2014; Alexander & Brown, 2011; Botvinick, 2007). Future
studies should extend these findings to other conflict par-
adigms to determine the robustness and generalizability of
our results. Lastly, we demonstrated how this automatic
affective evaluation of conflict could be observed on task rep-
etitions only, suggesting that the affective concomitants of
cognitive conflicts are processed in a task-specific manner.
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